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The chances for Chile to gain membership in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
in the next year have virtually disappeared because of strong opposition in the US Congress to grant
President Bill Clinton's request for "fast- track" negotiating authority. The authority, which must
be renewed annually, allows the US president to negotiate all issues contained in the treaty with
the assurance that Congress will not alter the contents of the accord, thus greatly increasing the
executive's bargaining power in the negotiations. Under fast-track provisions, Congress waives its
authority to make changes to the final agreement, meaning that consideration of the final treaty is
a simple "yes" or "no" vote. In the case of Chile, President Eduardo Frei's administration has told
the US that full NAFTA negotiations cannot proceed unless President Clinton receives fast-track
authority.
The Chilean government has repeatedly expressed concern that the absence of fast-track authority
would allow the US Congress to open the treaty to endless amendments, which could potentially
eliminate many clauses already agreed upon by representatives of the US, Canada, Mexico, and
Chile. Congress which has Republican majorities in both the House and the Senate has engaged
in a constant tug-of-war this year with the Clinton administration to exert greater influence on US
domestic and foreign policies. In mid- October, the full House voted to reject Clinton's request for
fast-track authority, even though the House Ways and Means Committee had already approved
limited authority for Clinton in late September (see NotiSur, 10/19/95).
The fast-track measure that the full House rejected in October was included in the budget
reconciliation bill. The Clinton administration had already expressed opposition even to the
measure approved by the Ways and Means Committee. Although that measure granted the Clinton
administration fast-track authority, it excluded provisions granting the president the power to
negotiate parallel accords on environmental protection and labor rights, similar to those already
negotiated with Mexico and Canada under NAFTA. Major obstacles to the fast track are also
appearing in the Senate. As of Nov. 7, the Senate had not voted on granting an extension of the
fast-track authority to the president. However, in a speech on the Senate floor, Senate Majority
Leader Robert Dole (R-Kansas) opposed renewal of the fast track for Clinton. Dole, who has greatly
succeeded in influencing the direction of Senate decisions this year, went as far as to question
whether Clinton should be negotiating any more trade agreements. In his speech, the Senate leader
charged that Clinton had failed to explain to the US public why a new trade pact is needed at this
time.
"We're choking on new agreements right now," said Dole, who noted that the impact on the US
of NAFTA and the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) has
not been fully assessed. "I believe we need to step back from this unprecedented whirlwind of
new trade agreements." According to some political analysts, Dole who was a key supporter of
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both the GATT and NAFTA accords is opposing the fast track for political purposes. One of Dole's
rivals for the Republican presidential nomination, commentator Patrick Buchanan, has taken an
openly protectionist stance. In addition, Dole has used the same arguments as his House Republican
counterparts in opposing the parallel agreements on the environment and labor rights negotiated
by Clinton with Mexico and Canada. "We cannot and must not burden our trade relationships with
the agendas of any number of interest groups," he said. With the near-certain rejection of fast-track
authority, Clinton faces an uphill battle in promoting the creation of a hemispherewide free-trade
area, which is a key economic and political proposal for the current administration. The proposal
was formally unveiled in December 1994 at the Summit of the Americas in Miami (see NotiSur,
12/16/95).
Because of the staunch opposition in Congress, many political analysts suggest the Clinton
administration may not be able to gain approval for any new trade initiatives in 1996, since
Republicans are unlikely to give Clinton any sort of political victory during an election year. Indeed,
the Clinton administration had viewed the inclusion of Chile in NAFTA as one of the first steps in
creating the hemispherewide free-trade area. This was evident at the Summit of the Americas, when
the decision to enter negotiations with Chile was announced by Clinton, President Ernesto Zedillo of
Mexico, President Eduardo Frei of Chile, and Prime Minister Jean Chretien of Canada. These same
four leaders are expected to address the issue of NAFTA again in late November at the meeting
of the Asia- Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum in Osaka, Japan. All four countries are
members of APEC.
The Frei administration has already begun to accept the strong possibility that Chile will not be
joining NAFTA in the near future. Speaking to reporters in London in early November, Chilean
Foreign Minister Jose Miguel Insulza said the possibilities are "very slim" that Chile will be able
to enter into any negotiations with the NAFTA countries by the end of this year. Indeed, the
likelihood that fast-track authority would be rejected was the subject of a special meeting between
US Ambassador Gabriel Guerra-Mondragon and key members of Chile's legislature in late October.
"If fast-track authority is not approved, we will have to wait until after the upcoming US elections
and take up the matter again at the beginning of 1997," said Guerra-Mondragon.
Chilean legislators, for their part, told Guerra- Mondragon they were frustrated that "internal
politics" in the US were creating difficulties for the vision of a hemispheric agreement proposed by
Clinton at the Summit of the Americas. "The power of commercial negotiations resides essentially in
the US Congress," said Jaime Estevez, a legislative leader in Chile's Chamber of Deputies. President
Frei, in last-minute attempts to sway the US Congress to support fast-track authority, traveled
twice to North America in the span of two months. During one of the visits, Frei traveled to Mexico
City to meet with President Zedillo to discuss possible NAFTA strategies and to gain the Mexican
president's support for "prompt" negotiations on NAFTA. Chile and Mexico already have a bilateral
free-trade agreement, which went into effect at the start of 1992.
During their meetings, Zedillo and Frei addressed a series of bilateral issues, including several
rifts between Chile and Mexico over agricultural trade, and reached an informal agreement to
address those differences. In fact, in a joint statement, Zedillo and Frei said the two countries had
made enough of a commitment to iron out their disagreements over agricultural trade that the only
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obstacle for Chile to enter NAFTA was the lack of fast-track authority for Clinton. Frei's second visit
to North America was to attend the 50th anniversary of the founding of the UN in October. He also
used this occasion to attempt to sway the US Congress to grant Clinton fast-track authority.
Still, despite the diminished possibilities for Clinton to receive fast-track authority, some members
of President Frei's administration have attempted to put a positive spin on the situation. For
example, Juan Gabriel Valdes, the Chilean government's chief NAFTA negotiator, told reporters
in Santiago in mid-October that even without fast-track authority the Frei administration would
not fully abandon negotiations on entry into NAFTA. According to Valdes, Chile was working with
all the mechanisms at its disposal to enter NAFTA. "We are aware of the unpredictable nature of
the US legislative process," said Valdes. "We could soon find ourselves at the negotiating table."
According to trade specialists, once Chile is allowed into NAFTA, that country could greatly expand
trade with the US, Canada, and Mexico.
In the meantime, trade patterns between Chile and the US, and between Chile and Mexico, appear
to be changing, with or without NAFTA. Statistics published by Chile's Central Bank in early
November showed Chile's exports to Mexico in January-September totaled only US$99.6 million,
a decline of more than 36% from the same period in 1994. At the same time, Chilean imports from
Mexico in January-September totaled US$420.6 million, an increase of almost 120%. Chile's trade
deficit with Mexico is widely blamed on the devaluation of the Mexican peso. Also during JanuarySeptember, the US became the principal source of Chile's imports, but the US continued behind
Japan as the main market for Chilean products. The report said Chilean exports to Japan in JanuarySeptember increased by 64.5% from a year ago, compared with a growth rate of 16.4% for Chilean
exports to the US during the same period. Indeed, Japan surpassed the US as the principal market
for Chilean products in 1994, and has not relinquished that spot.
On the other hand, the statistics showed that Chile imported US$2.7 billion worth of US products
in January- September, an increase of 45.9% relative to the same period in 1994. In contrast, Chilean
imports of US products for all of 1994 only increased by 6.5% relative to 1993. The Central Bank
report also showed that Chilean trade was increasing with Brazil and Argentina, the two largest
countries in the Southern Cone Common Market (MERCOSUR). In January-September, Chile
imported more than US$1 billion worth goods and services from Argentina, an increase of 50% from
the same nine-month period in 1994. At the same time, Chilean imports from Brazil totaled US$881
million, an increase of almost 20% from the same period in 1994. Chilean exports to Argentina in
January-September reached US$427 million, a decline of almost 8% from a year ago. The report did
not offer statistics for Chilean exports to Brazil.
With the reduced possibilities for Chile to enter NAFTA in 1996, much of the Chilean government's
attention has turned to the negotiations to enter MERCOSUR. In early October, Chilean negotiators
were meeting with MERCOSUR counterparts to draft a list of exceptions for products that would
not qualify for immediate duty-free status. After one of the sessions, Chile's Economy Minister
Alvaro Garcia told reporters that negotiations for Chile's entry into MERCOSUR were proceeding
well. "The advances we made in the past several sessions give us reason for optimism," said Garcia.
"There is a strong sense of good will among the governments of MERCOSUR countries and Chile."
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Similarly, Foreign Minister Insulza told reporters in London that an agreement for Chile to enter
MERCOSUR was becoming a more likely development than for accession to NAFTA. According
to Insulza, negotiators from MERCOSUR and Chile are so optimistic about the advances made so
far in the talks that they are predicting conclusion of negotiations by December. "I would not bet
on reaching a conclusion by that time," he said. "But the negotiations are indeed proceeding at a
very good pace." [Sources: Agence France-Presse, 10/06/95; Associated Press-Dow Jones, 10/19/95;
Excelsior, 10/20/95; COPESA (Chile), 10/23-25/95, 11/01/95; Estrategia (Chile), 10/24/95, 10/25/95,
11/03/95; Notimex, Reuter, 11/03/95]
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